



Thomas W. Gray and Gillian Butler
Variousevents haveled tothedevelopmentofhighlycomplexcooperative opera-
tions and to concepts for understanding operations. However. development of
membership structures and concepts for understanding these structures has
lagged. This paperimports organizational design and contingency theory into the
member control literature. Membership structure is understood as organization-
like, producinga service (Le., membercontrol). Membercontrolstructureisunder-
stood as having three aspects (representation, policy making, and oversight) and
two environments (the members themselves, and management and operations).
Buildingfrom cooperativeprinciplesandfollowingthedevelopmentofcooperatives
from simple to complex organizations, this paper develops a series of axiomatic
propositions for understanding and designing membership structure. Onlysome
ofthe propositions are testable, and still others are meant only to give continuity
and relevance to the propositions as a group (as a theory). Suchwork should help
develop a language for understanding and furthering discussion and research of
membership structure and member control in agricultural cooperatives.
Thispaperseekstobroadenunderstandingofmembercontrolinagricul-
tural cooperativeswith large memberships. Our major purpose is to sug-
gest the outlines of a theory of membership structural design in axiom
form. Axiomatic approaches help define and explain central conceptsand
assumptions. They bring coherence with their conciseness and can help
providedirectiontoongoingandanticipatedworkandresearch(Frankfort-
NachmiasandNachmias 1992).Theyarefrequentlyusefulfor introducing
language and new levels ofanalysis.
Specificallywe: 1) import concepts from organizational design and con-
tingency theory into the membercontrol literature, 2) suggest their conti-
nuitywithconceptsofdemocraticorganization, 3) exploretheirapplication
to membership structure (understandingcooperatives abstractlyand his-
torically as moving from simple to complex organizations), and 4) derive
a setofinternallyconsistentorganizationalpropositions. Atmost, weseek
toapplyconceptsofbureaucracyto conceptsofdemocracyforthepurpose
of regulating and controlling bureaucracy. At a minimum, we seek to
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introduce, on an epistemological plane, new language and new concepts
for future analyses. Such axiomatic theory work is consistent with the
sociological and classic writings of Zetterberg (1963), Hage (1965), and
Collins (1975).
Introduction and Previous Studies on
Member Control
Most modem cooperatives try to adhere to a set ofprinciples and prac-
tices first systematicallylaid down during the British consumer coopera-
tive and German credit union movements of1840 to the l860s (Le., the
Rochdale, Raiffeisen, and Schulze-Delitzschprinciples). Various reformu-
lations have occurred, though all tend to be organized around common
themes. Briscoe et al. (1982, 40) suggest five different aspects:
1. Open and voluntary membership confined [sic] to all persons using
the cooperative, with no discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
politics, religion, or family background.
2. Ownership ofthe cooperative by member-users only.
3. Control ofthe cooperativevested with members. Organization ofthe
cooperativeshouldencouragememberparticipationindecisionmak-
ing and balloting on a one member, one vote basis.
4. Benefitsreceivedbymembersinproportiontotheiruseofthecooper-
ative.
5. Returnoninvestmentsetata limitedrateofinterest [sic, e.g., return].
Dunn (1988, 85) reportsjust three:
1. The User-Owner Principle: People who ownand finance the coopera-
tive are those who use the cooperative.
2. The User-Control Principle: People who control the cooperative are
those who use the cooperative.
3. The User-Benefits Principle: The cooperative's solepurposeis to pro-
vide and distribute benefits to its users on the basis oftheir use.
Democraticgovernance (control) isseenbysomeascentraltotheseprinci-
plesandtovariousdefinitions (SchomischandMirowsky[Butler] 1981, 4).
A cooperative is a business voluntarily owned and controlled by its member
patronsand operatedbythemona nonprofitorcostbasis (Schaars 1980,77).
Cooperative societies are democratic organizations. Their affairs should be
administered by persons elected or appointed in a manner agreed by the
membersandaccountabletothem. Membersofprimarysocietiesshouldenjoy
equal rights ofvoting (one member, one vote) and participation in decisions
affecting their societies (International Cooperative Alliance 1967, 36).
Historically, research on member control has focused at the social-
psychological level and with such questions as how to get members to
meetings, involved in office holding, and voting. Singer characterizes this
body of work as the "member relations paradigm." It is a sub-set ofthe
larger participation research area and is represented by various authors
includingAndersonandSanderson(1943), Bealetal. (1951),John (1953),
Folkman (1955), Brown and Bealer (1957), Copp (1964), Torgerson et al.Membership Structural Design/Gray and Butler 29
(1972), Rogers (l971), Heffernan (l967), Warner (1966), Warnerand Rog-
ers (l971), andothers. Mostofthesepapersfocused specificallyonpartici-
pation with an implicit assumption that member control and member
democracy are, in part, realized with member involvement.
Boynton and Elitzak (1982,4) shifted away from participation research
and addressed member control directly, defining control as "the ability of
anindividualorgrouptoaffectanorganization'sobjectivesandthestrate-
gies used in the pursuit ofthose objectives." They suggested control may
be "active," and involve such acts as voting, serving on committees, and
holding office, or "passive," implyingan amount ofcontrol members have
passivelybut could exercise ifdissatisfied with the cooperative. However,
their focus remained at the social-psychological level, asking individual
members howmuch control they perceived they had and howmuch they
perceived they should have.
With its focus on the individual, this paradigm is found incomplete.
Cooperativeshavemadedramaticincreasesinsize overthelastfortyyears
(Kraenzle et al. 1993). Most agricultural cooperatives began as relatively
small, single-product organizations. As such they were highly accessible
to and easily understood by their members. However, many have since
grownintolarge, multi-productbusinessesusingsophisticatedtechnolog-
ies and serving large geographic territories.
In the small cooperative, those that can accommodate their total mem-
bershipin town-meetingtype decisionmaking, membercontrol (influence
andequality)doesnotpresentcompromisingproblems. Membershiptends
tobehomogeneousacross severalcharacteristics. Elected representatives
tend to be representative, Le. embodying many ofthe wants, needs, and
opinions typical of the general membership. As cooperatives grow into
thousands ofmembers, the shape that democratic decision makingmust
take in pursuit ofmember control changes. Members can seldom be
assembled at one place and at one time. If they could be assembled,
gettingmemberinputorganized, articulated, anddiscussedwouldbecome
cxtremelyawkward and difficult (Gray 1988, Butler 1988).
This context caused a crisis in the participation paradigm and drove
cooperative size into analyses. Studies emerged to isolate the affect of
cooperativesizeonparticipation/control (WarnerandHilander 1964, Las-
ley 1981,Van Ravensway 1982, Boyntonand Elitzak 1982, andAls 1982.)
Lasley introduced formal organizational concepts into the member rela-
tions research, relating participation to various organizational measures
(formalization, centralization) ofcooperativeoperations. Butler(1988) and
Gray (1988) followed bybeginningconceptualworkonmembership struc-
tureas organization.Theearlierapproach tends tofocus onthe individual
andondeterminants ofindividualbehavior. Newapproaches need to inte-
grate organization.
The Concept ofOrganization
The study of organization has not yielded one unified, agreed upon
theory. Rather, several different perspectives have emerged-sometimes
categorized as organizational development, organizational theory, and/or
organizationaldesign (Hage and Finsterbusch 1987). We follow Mintzberg30 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1994
(1979) and Van de Ven and Ferry (1980) for rudimentary definitions of
organization, and we use the concept oforganizational contingencyintro-
duced by Burns and Stalker (1961) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). We
will explain this terminology as we proceed.
Following Mintzberg (1979), we see organizations developing out oftwo
dynamics-specialization and coordination-both central and inter-
related within an organization. People come together, or are brought
together, to pursue certain goals and objectives. Behaviors and activities
are sometimes specified narrowly, sometimesbroadly. Severalpeoplemay
do the same jobs in different locations; a few people, or a lot of people,
may do narrowly defined jobs independently or together. A specializa-
tion occurs.
Coordination occurs with specialization. Specialization allows some
tasks to be completed more efficiently; coordination brings tasks together
in an overall pursuit of organizational goals. The interplay of these two
tendenciesdefinesorganizationalstructure. "Thestructureofanorganiza-
tioncanbe defined simplyas thesumtotal oftheways inwhich itspecial-
izes its labor into distinct tasks and achieves coordination among them"
(Mintzberg 1979, 3).
"Contingencytheoryargues that different organizational structures are
reqUired for different organizational contexts" (Hage and Finsterbusch
1987, 87). Specializations and coordinations must be accommodated in
differentarrangementsaccordingtopressuresfromanorganization'senvi-
ronment. These arrangements-or organizational design options-medi-
ate the tension between specialization/coordination and environmental
stressors. Stressors create uncertainty; design options rationalize and
manage the stress such that goals and objectives can be approximated.
These relationships are presented in table 1.
Bureaucratic/Democratic Organization and Design Options
Bureaucracyand democracy are frequently viewed as opposingways of
organizing. There are distinct differences. Personnel selection procedures
and criteria differ: In a bureaucracy an individual is hired for a position
on the basis of ability to do a certain job; in a democracy an individual
Table I.-Structural Design Strategies
Sources of Uncertainty
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• Delegation of authority
• Standardization of information flows
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is elected to fill an office to represent constituent interests. Dismissal
procedures vary: In a bureaucracy a few, pre-specified officials have
authoritytodismissanemployee; ina democracya bodyofrepresentatives
or qualified electors make dismissal decisions (impeachment or recall)
through pre-specified voting rules.
Both, however, are rational-legal mechanisms, based on formally
defined rules and procedures. Authority in both is embedded in the posi-
tion rather than in a person. And both can be understood as having cen-
trally important specialization and coordination dynamics. Structural
forms ofeachtakeshapeas accommodationsthataccountfor andprocess
stressors from their respective environments.
Structural Design Options and Use. Design options are the structural
choices that realize specialization and coordination. Democratic and
bureaucratic organizations solve this dynamic in similar ways.
1. Horizontal divisions: Organizations have a variety ofdemands
placed on them. To help sort out and homogenize demands, an organiza-
tion cansplitinto departments. These departments specializeinhandling
a narrowerrange ofproblems than those faced bythe entire organization.
Atthe mostbasic level, departmentalizationmaybe defined byidentifying
a direction and goal function and an operations and methods function.
TheseareorganizationaldepartmentsWithseparatetasks, locatedinsepa-
rate places Within the structure. Various logics can be used. The split
between members/directors and management/employees is by function.
Further splits could be made by product, market, geography, or client
group. Some examples are illustrated in figures 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Figure 1 depicts operations ofa cooperative departmentalized predomi-
nantlybygeographiclocationandfunction. Functionsaresplitintoopera-
tionsandadministration.Theoperationsfunctionisdividedbygeographic
function (Region Iand Region II). Each region is further departmentalized
by local geographic site. Figure 2 illustrates cooperative operations pre-
dominantly departmentalized by product. Departments include fertilizer,
lumber, feed, eggs, oil, hardware, and auto sales. Figure 3 presents the
operations structure ofa cooperative departmentalized byproduct (petro-
leum, feed, and crops) With geographiclocationusedWithinproductlines.
Similarly, a democracy may divide tasks into departments. Figure 4
depictsa membershipstructuredepartmentalizedbyfunction (youngcou-
pIes committee and young couples groups, resolutions/districting com-
mittee, and delegate body and alternates) and by geographic district and
region.1 There are three regions and eleven districts. Each department is
separated from the othersand has separate duties and delegated authori-
ties (though departments can be created Without delegated authorities.)
The structural task ofdepartments is specialization.
When several departments are created, the organization is strung out
horizontally (termed horizontal differentiation).
2.Verticallevels: Horizontaldepartmentsmustbecoordinatedfortheir
end results to contribute to overall objectives ofthe organization. Without
this, the organization Will fall apart. Overhead departments must be cre-
ated to bring cohesion and organizational purpose. For example, figure 1
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supervisorlocations. Oneoftheplantsupervisorsbringsactivitiestogether
from the beans, grain, and maintenance areas. The general manager
brings overall coordination to the organization. In figure 4, the young
couples committee coordinates the various young couples groups. The
boardofdirectorscoordinatestheresolutions/districtcommittee,thedele-
gate body, and the various committees shown. Each level has authority
over levels under it.
In a bureaucracy employees may report to supervisors, who report to
department heads, who report to a general manager. A democracy may
have local districts, regional boards, delegates, and a board ofdirectors.
The sources of authority are reversed. In a bureaucracy the source of
authority may lie in the general manager, who may delegate down, where
in a democracy the source ofauthority lies with the members, who may
delegate up. These departments add height to organizational charts and
are termed vertical differentiations.
3. Job orTask Specialization: "Individuals are generalists when their
jobs involve a largenumber ofbroadlydefined tasks, problems, orissues;
whereas theyare specialistswhen a small numberofrather narrow tasks
and problems occupy most oftheir working time" (Van de Ven and Ferry
1980, 210). Job specializations generally are developed within depart-
ments, focusing on departmental duties within the confines ofdelegated
authorities. These authorities are assigned to particular positions filled
by individuals. (Authority to make final decisions mayor may not be













managers. clerks. and mechanics. A democracy may have board officers,
advisorycommitteemembers, resolutioncommitteemembers, anda presi-
dent ofthe young leaders group.
4. Delegation of Authority: In both bureaucracies and democracies,
some decisions are delegated to specific organizational departmentsand/
or positions. For instance, a bureaucracy may delegate decisions about
which applicants shall be granted credit to the finance department. A
democracy may delegate responsibility for oversight ofthese credit deci-
sionstoitsfinancecommittee. Decisionmakingishighlycentralizedwhen-
evera few peopleatthe top ofthe organizationhavethe authorityto make
most decisions. Conversely, decision making is decentralized when the
authority to make decisions is widely dispersed among members. The
structuraltask ofdelegationscanbebothcoordinationand/orspecializa-
tion.
In a cooperative. where member control and influence over decision
making is central to definitions of cooperative organization. delegation
to the board of directors or to hired management are both examples of
centralization. Authority is removed (or delegated) to fewer members.
Whendelegatedtomanagement.itisremovedfromdirectmemberdecision
makingentirely.Itiscentralizedoutoftherealmofdirectmemberdecision
making and into a member environment (Le.. management and opera-
tions).
5. Standardization or Ad Hoc Communications: "Standardization is
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Employees
cedures include official arrangements, which are either formal (docu-
mented inwriting), regular, orcustomary (repeated behavioroccurringat
prescribed time intervals)" (Butler 1988, 36). Examples are strict rules,
formal meetings at prescribed times, and standard operatingprocedures.
Both bureaucracy and democracy use formally defined procedures. For
example, bureaucracies have credit policies, cash discount policies, and
sick leave policies. Democracies have established procedures like those
for nominating candidates, making resolutions, and notifying members
of meetings. The higher the number of formally defined procedures, the
higher the level ofstandardization in the organization.
Examples of ad hoc structural options include temporary committees
to handle specific one-time problems or survey instruments to assess
members' views on specific issues. Formal communication alternatives
couldincludepermanentcommitteesandpositionsthatbypassothersub-
structures within the organization. The structural task ofthese options
is coordination.
Complexorganizationanddemocraticorganizationsharemanysimilari-
ties and lend themselves to similar conceptual treatment. As kinds of
organizations, itisfundamentalthatbothmustresolvethespecialization/
coordination dynamic and do so using various structural options. What
specific options are exercised, what shape the structure takes, depends
on environmental conditions. The following section will again present the
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A ContingencyApproach To Membership Structure
From a contingency theory approach, structural design choices must
mesh environmental contingencies with specialization!coordination in a
waythat accounts formember control. Fourenvironmental contingencies
will be addressed in this paper: quantitative complexity, (closely related)
diversity, qualitative complexity, and stability/instability.
Connplexity/Diversity (Van de Ven and Ferry 1980, 94-95) refers to
the manageability of problems facing an organization. Can problems be
handled in a straight-forward manner, or do they need to be subdivided?
Are demands so great in number that they overburden an organization
so nothing can be done? Are they so complicated that technical training
is requiredto resolvethem?Thefirstsetofproblemsistermed quantitative
complexity, the second, technicalcomplexity. Diversityissimilarto quanti-
tative complexityinthat a number ofdemands are placed onan organiza-
tion, though the demands come from several different kinds ofsources.36 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1994
Stability/instabilityreferstothespeedwithwhichchangeinanorgani-
zation's environment occurs. When a cooperative works in a stable envi-
ronment, the time and nature ofdemands are known or are roughly pre-
dictable in characterand occurrence. Inan unstable environment, events
occur rapidly and tend not to be predictable.
Original Cooperative Structuring: Empirically, when farmers pool
theirmarketingand purchasingneeds in forming cooperatives, they typi-
cally encounter quantitative complexity problems. While many farmers'
needswill overlap, allwillnot-somewill contradict, otherswill beunique
to individualfarmers. Farmersmust establish procedures to serve collec-
tive as opposed to individual interests. Coordination must occur.
"Authority is the power to decide what is to be done, by whom, and to
what standard" (Kenny et al. 1986,49). Members delegate authority to a
board ofdirectors through an election process. Bythis, an organizational
form takes shape, and diversity (quantitative complexity) among the sev-
eralmembersisresolvedfromanorganizationalviewpoint.Theboard, asa
body, assumes authorityand responsibilityfor managingthe cooperative,
bringing coordination to the different member interests.
Members may further delegate to hired management. Historically,
agricultural cooperatives have been small organizations, providing few
and easily understood services for local farmers in local markets. The
operations component in such organizations may only involve weekly,
monthly, or even seasonal management. Under these circumstances, a
boardofdirectorsmembermightserveasbothdirectorandhiredmanager.
However, many cooperatives have since grown into large, complicated
organizations. Most environments are no longer simple. Products and
services aremanyandvaried. Itis likelymanagementrequires specialized
knowledge and full-time attention to operations. Delegating authority to
a hired, full-time, professionally trained manager may be necessary to
coordinate and interpret a technically complex, difficult-to-manage envi-
ronment.
Delegation bymembers to management may also be due to a quantita-
tively complex environment. Board members are farmers with their own
farm businessesto run. Theygenerally cannotbe available to perform the
rangeoftasksassociatedwithdailyoperationsofthecooperative. Further,
boardmembers holdauthorityas a group. To require committee decision-
making for countless operational detailswould severelyhamper effective-
ness. Delegation to management quantitatively simplifies the farmers'
environment.
These delegations putin place, from the standpointofinitial organizing
and structuring, a membership structure with two environments, the
members themselves and management and operations.
These original structurings suggest the following propositions:
1. The greater the complexity ofthe farmer environment, the greater
the delegation ofauthority to a board.
2. The greater the complexity of the farmer/board environment, the
greater the delegation ofauthority to management and operations.
3. The greater the delegation ofauthority to management, the greater
the loss ofdirect control by members.Membership Structural Design/Gray and Butler 37
Delegations representin some sense a loss ofcontrol. Members give their
authority to make decisions to someone else. Generally, operational deci-
sions are delegated to management. Policy making and oversight provis-
ions are retained within the membership, but are delegated to elected
representatives. Membercontrol becomes differentiated within the struc-
ture dependingonwhetherthe goal is representation, policy making, and/
oroversight-representationtendingtobemostresponsive to themember
environment, policy making and oversight to the management environ-
ment.
The Member Environment-Quantitative Complexity and Diver-
sity: Contingency theory suggests an organization facing a diverse envi-
ronment can improve its performance if it identifies like segments ofits




departments for retail sales, institutional sales, and international sales.
Large-membership cooperatives may have similar members in diverse
locations. Departmentalization can simplify this by horizontally dividing




into a series ofgeographic member districts and divisions. Otherbases of
representation are pOSSible. Members might be divided by type or size of
farming operation, orby membership tenure. These divisions account for
member diversity.
The following propositions derive from the above relationships:
4. The greaterthe diversityinmembership (large clustersofdissimilar
characteristics), the greater the need for horizontal divisions into
departments.
5. Thelargerthe membershipquantitatively (largenumberswith simi-
larcharacteristics), thegreatertheneed for horizontaldivisions into
departments.
6. The greater the number ofhorizontal departments, the greater the
possibilities for member representation.
ManagementandOperationsEnvironment-TechnicalComplexity:
The technical complexity ofan environment increases as the variety and
technical sophistication ofactivitiespursuedwithinitincreases. As coop-
erativeoperationsaddnewproducts, services, commodities, technologies,
and market areas, members are confrontedwith an increasingly complex
management environment. Member control at the board level (Le., over-
sightand policymaking) is challenged. Lossofmembercontrolmayoccur
asboardmembers are unable to processincreasinglymore complexinfor-
mation. Contingency theory suggests this complex environment may be
simplifiedwithjoband/ortaskspecializations. Oversightand policymak-
ingcanbe enhancedbyusing specialized committeesthatdealwith single38 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1994
commodities, markets, orsingleaspects ofoperations (e.g., finance, mem-
ber relations, marketing).
A contingency approach suggests the following propositions:
7. The greater the complexity ofmanagement and operations, the
greater the relative delegation ofauthority to management, the
greater the loss ofdirect control by members.
8. The greater the delegation ofauthority to management and opera-
tions, the greater the use of specialization within the board, the
greater the oversight and policy making possibilities.
MemberandManagementEnvironments: Stable/UnstableEnviron-
ments. Some organizations operate in relatively unchanging conditions,
selling the same products to the same members year after year. Other
organizations face rapidly changing circumstances. In a stable environ-
ment, an organization can standardize many of its activities to achieve
coordination and predictability. In an unstable environment, it is less
appropriate to standardize since new situations constantly occurthat do
not conform to the rules. The organization must remain flexible so it can
adapt qUickly to newcircumstances. Many different influences maymake
a cooperative'senvironmentsunstable. Examplesareirregularpricemove-
ments, rapid memberturnover, high rates ofurbanization, unpredictable
demand in international markets, or changing government policies.
Member control ultimately concerns communication channels. Ifcom-
munication cannot occur dUring critical periods, member input cannot
occur. Ad hoc communications, such as temporary committees, surveys,
or farm visits, can allow access and coordination.
A contingency approach suggests the following propositions:
9. The greater the stability in a member structure environment, the
greater the use ofstandardization options and the greater the cer-
tainty ofmember control possibilities.
10. The greater the instability in a member structure environment, the
greater the use ofad hoc communications options and the greater
the member control possibilities.
The Internal Environment: Size. As size and diversity ofmembership
increase, need for greaterhorizontal differentiation occurs. However, large
numbers ofhorizontaldepartmentswithin a membership structurethem-
selves present quantitative complexityproblems. Such departments need
tobecoordinated. Coordinationcanoccurbydesigningover-archingverti-
cal departments (vertical differentiations). Contingency theory suggests:
11. The greater the number ofhorizontal departments created, the
greater the need for coordinating vertical departments.
12. The greater the horizontal and vertical departmentalization within
a membershipstructure, thegreaterthepossibilitiesforrepresenta-
tion.
Addinglevels ofrepresentation toa membership structure createsmecha-
nismsforcoordinating, givingincreasedfocus tomembers'disparateinter-
ests.Membership Structural Design/Gray and Butler 39
However, the greater horizontal and vertical differentiations in a struc-
ture, themorecomplexitis.Thestructureitselfmayblockcontactbetween
individual members and oversight and policy making centers. Creating
alternative paths from members to the board can mediate some of this
complexity. Separate functional hierarchies, such as a resolutions path,
a delegatepath, and a young-memberprogrampath, canincreasealterna-
tives and facilitate access. These specializations become separate depart-
mental hierarchies.
This approach suggests the following propositions:
13. Thegreaterthe complexityofthemembershipstructure, thegreater
the need for specialization ofdepartment hierarchies.
14. Thegreaterthespecializationofdepartmenthierarchies, thegreater
the possibilities for member representation.
Eventually bureaucracy captures democracy. Ultimately the structure
itselfmust act as a limit on itself, generating the following proposition:
15. Internal structural complexity (both quantitative and qualitative)
imposes limits on horizontal and vertical differentiations and
departmentalizations and specializations.
The forgoing set of fifteen statements outlines conceptual space for a
theoreticallanguageandfocusfor organizationalanalysesofmembercon-
trol structures. Complex membership structures can be understood in
terms oforganizationalconcepts. Ouraxiomssuggestthatwhenmember-
shipstructureisdesignedtocoincidewithitsenvironments, (Le., member,
and management and operations environments) structure can improve
potentialfor membercontrol. Obviously, empiricalandfurtherconceptual
workneeds to be done. Ourpurposes have been to initiate organizational
languageandtosurfacesomeofthepromiseofthesetheoreticalconstructs
when applied to membership structure.
Conclusion
Most agricultural cooperatives began as relatively small, local, single-
product organizations. As such they were highly accessible to and easily
understood by their members. Many ofthese small agricultural coopera-
tives have grown into large multi-productbusinesses using sophisticated
technologiesand servicinglargegeographicalterritories.Theselarge coop-
eratives use bureaucratic structures and procedures to coordinate and
control their complex operations: They divide their work among various
departmentsandlevelsofthe organization, hireprofessionalsand special-
ists to make specific decisions, and use standardized reports and proce-
dures.
Thoughthesebureaucraticstructuresandproceduresmakecooperative
operations more efficient, they present a challenge to the ideal of demo-
cratic member control. Ifinformationdemands are so large thatmembers
cannot process them (quantitative complexity), orso technical that mem-
bers lack skill or time to figure them out (technical compleXity), or if
demands change so rapidly a timely response is impossible (instability),
the organization may fail. Failure from a membership structure perspec-40 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1994
tive is failure in member control, representation. oversight. and policy
making.
An earlier paradigm ofmember control research focused at the social-
psychological level ofindividual farmers and sought answers to such
issuesasgettingfarmerstomeetings.voting, patronizing,andinvolvement
in office-holding. A newer paradigm looks at organization ofmembership
itself.Whileearlierquestionsandanswersremainimportant, theorganiza-
tionallevel needs to be understood so new strategies can be developed to
help answer old and new questions. New answers may include. not only
social-psychological answers, but also strategies that include creating
departmentstohandlequantitativecomplexity.jobspecializationstohan-
dle technical complexity, delegations ofauthority to handle both aspects
of complexity, and various standardization and ad hoc communication
alternativestohandlestabilityjinstability. Empiricalworkliesahead. Per-
haps most promising may be research on the performance ofalternative
member control structures. Participation and participation research
remain important. Structure provides context. There is no control when
structures are empty.
This paper contributes to an organizational orientation to membership
by developing a series of axioms to help ground and articulate central
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